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REMEDIES OF A WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED
EMPLOYE.
CONTRAcr-REs ADJUDICATA-JUDGMENT A BAR TO SECOND
SUIT UPON SAME CAusE oF AcTION.-Allen v. Collieq Engineert
Co., 46 At. R. (Pa.) 899, (1900). A few cases may with advantage
be added to the interesting note (39 Am. Law Reg. N. S., 428)
upon Alie v. Nadeau, 44 Atl. 891, (1899), holding that a wrongfully
discharged employe may bring only one action. Alie v. Nadeau is
not only not the law of Pennsylvania, but is contrary to the weight
of authority. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an opinion
handed down by Mr. Justice Fell, on July 11, 1900 (after the July
issue of this inagazine went to print), decided that where a servant
whose wages are payable periodically is wrongfully discharged he
may maintain separate actions for each installment of salary: Allen
56o
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v. Colliery Engineers Company, 46 Atlantic Reporter, 899, (1900),
the Court said :
"The generally recognized rule is that an employe for a fixed
period who has been wrongfully discharged may either treat the con-
tract as existing and sue for his salary as it becomes due, not on a
quantum meruil, but by virtue of the special contract, his readi-
ness to serve being considered equivalent to actual service, or he may
sue for the breach of contract at once or at the end of the contract
period, but for the breach he can have but one action; 2 Smith's
Leading Cases, note to Cutter v. Powell, 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.),
148, note to Huntington v. R. R. Co. Our cases are in entire har-
mony with this rule. In Algeo v. Algeo, 10 S. & R, 235, it was
held that where the performance of the services had been prevented
by the discharge of the employe, he must declare on the special
agreement and could not recover on the implied promise, as the law
would infer the promise from the acts of the plaintiff only and not
from the acts of prevention by the defendant. In Clay Telephone
Co. v. Root, 17 W. N. C., 200, the plaintiff sued during the contract
period on an agreement which, as in this case, was severable because
the consideration was apportioned. In the opinion in Kirk v. Hart-
man, 63 Pa. 97, it was said by Sharswood J., that a servant dis-
missed without cause before the expiration of a definite period of
employment could maintain an action of debt on the special agree-
ment.
"It follows that if the recovery in the New York Court was for
the intallments of salary then due, as alleged in the declaration in this
case, the plaintiff may maintain his action; if it was for damages for
breach of the contract as averred in the plea filed, he is concluded
-by it."
This decision of course supersedes Eisenhower v. &hool District,
13 Pa. Superior Court, 57, (February 16, 1900), in which a pre-
cisely opposite conclusion was reached by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.
Allen v. Colliery Engineers Company is supported by the great
weight of authority.
"It is not a matter of doubt that when a contract is made for per-
sonal services, for a particular term, at stipulated wages, if the party
employed is, without cause, discharged during the term
he is not compelled to accept the breach of his employer as a ter-
mination of the contract . . . If the wages are payable by
installments, he may sue for and recover each installment as it be-
comes due:" Strauss v. Meertie, 64 Ala. 299, (1879); Liddell v.
Chidester, 84 Ala. 508, (1887).
"The salary being payable weekly, she could, at any time, sue for
all due her at the time of commencing suit, without barring her
right to afterward sue for and recover salary subsequently becoming
due." McEvoy v. Bock, 37 Minn. 402, (1887).
Where wages are payable weekly or monthly, each installment
gives rise to a separate cause of action: Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H.
481, (1834); Whitaker v. Sandifer, 1 Duvall (Ky.) 261, (1864);
NOTES.
Armfield v. Nash, 31 Miss. 361, (1856); Blun v. Sterne, 53 Ga.
82, (1874); Badger v. Tilcomb, 15 Pick 409, (1834).
Where money is payable by installments, a distinct cause of action
arises upon the falling due of each installment, and they may
be recovered in successive actions; nor will a recovery for one such
installment bar an action for another which falls due after the com-
mencement of the first action : Hamm v. Beaver, 31 Pa. 58, (1857) ;
Arnfield v. Nash, 31 Miss. 361, (1856); Priest v. Deaver, 22 Mo.
App. 276, (1886); W eiler v. Henaric (Oreg.), 13 Pac. Rep. 614,
(1887).
Alie v. Nadeau assumes that a contract of employment, with
wages payable in installments, is indivisible; in fact, counsel in that
case seem to have so admitted. But that very question is the vital
point in the case. When the consideration is expressly or impliedly
apportioned, the contract is not entire but severable, and successive
actions lie: Lueco Oil Co. v. Brewer, 66 Pa. 355, (1870); Rugg v.
Moore, 110 Pa. 236, (1885); Gil v. Lumber Co., 151 Pa. 534,
(1892); McLaughlin v. Hes, 164 Pa. 570, (1894).
The maxim "nemo debit vexari si constet curio quod si pro una et
eadem causa " can therefore have no application, for there are, in
fact and in law, several distinct and separate causes of action for the
various installments of salary as they fall due. Of course, as
pointed out by Mr. Justice Fell, the discharged employe may,
if he so elect, "sue for the breach of contract at once or at the
end of the period," [See Wilke v. Harrison, 166 Pa. 202, (1895)],
but possibly the wiser plan would be to sue for salary as salary,
after it has in fact accrued, and not compel the jury to guess as to
the plaintiff's probable earnings during the remainder of the term.
"An employe for a determinate period, if improperly dismissed be-
fore the term of service has expired, is primafaieentitled to recoverthe stipulated compensation for the whole term" : Kirk v. Hariman,
63 Pa. 107, (1869) ; King v. Steren, 44 Pa. 105, (1862).
"Subject . . . to a reduction by the amount of what hehas earned, or might have earned, in the meantime by other employ-ment"p: Note to Huningn v. . R. Go., 7 Law Reg. (N. S. 148),
1867.
Although evidence of plaintiffs earnings elsewhere is technically
matter for alfirmative defence, as a matter of practice it is as wellto frankly prove, while the plaintiff is on the stand, his diligent
efforts to secure other employment, and the amount earned therein.
Ira .Tewell Williams.
August, 1900.
